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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (5 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670511

11 January 1968

AD 386614  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters 188th Maintenance Battalion (DS), Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 188TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION (DS)  
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF SC MB CO

9 August 1967

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: Commanding Officer  
15th Support Brigade  
ATTN: AVDF SC OP  
APO 96374

Commanding General  
HQ, US Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC DH  
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief  
US Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP OT  
APO 96558

Department of the Army  
ATTN: ACSFOR DA  
Washington, D. C. 20315

Transmitted herewith are copies of the quarterly Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967.

1 Incl  
as

*Cecil A. Crowe*  
CECIL A. CROWE  
LTC, OrdC  
Commanding

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## SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

### 1. ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFERS:

a. Until 30 June 1967 the 188th Maintenance Battalion (DS) was attached for operational control to Task Force Oregon. On 1 July 1967 the Battalion was attached to the Task Force for all purposes less promotion authority<sup>(1)</sup> and was further attached to the 15th Support Brigade.

### 2. MISSION:

a. The mission remains unchanged from that stated for the last reporting period and consists of providing direct support maintenance for all items of equipment except medical, cryptographic, ADPS/EAM, quarter-master air equipment, aircraft ammunition and equipment supported by Army-Wide Services as specified below:

- (1) Direct support to all Task Force Oregon base units.
- (2) Backup support to Task Force Oregon Brigades.
- (3) Operation of maintenance collection points.

b. This organization continues to be fully operational. It is presently in the process of preparing shop and technical supply areas for the monsoon season to avoid diminishing effectiveness during the coming rainy season.

### 3. LOSS AND RECEIPT OF UNITS:

a. Loss: None

b. Receipt: The 335th Transportation Company (Aircraft Direct Support) attached for operational control only, was attached for all purposes except promotion authority effective 1 July 1967.<sup>(2)</sup>

### 4. CHANGES IN BATTALION STAFF:

a. Departed:

CPT LININGER, GERALD A., Materiel Officer, 30 June 1967

CIT STOBBER, ROBERT L., Adjutant, 6 July 1967

1LT BARTLETT, ALVERY A., Supply Officer, 9 July 1967

b. Joined:

MAJ MCCLINTOCK, ALFRED B., Aircraft Equip Maint Off, 28 May 1967

(1) USARV, General Orders Number 3209, 27 June 1967

(2) VOCO, 15th Support Brigade

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**Section I: Significant Organizational Activities (Continued)**

CPT LEWIS, DAVID P., Adjutant, 29 June 1967

CPT DONDLINGER, JEROME C., Materiel Officer, 4 July 1967

2LT TAKATA, VICTOR T., Supply Officer, 5 July 1967

c. Open positions: None

**5. PLANS OPERATIONS:**

a. Plans: OPORD 02-67 (Security of Base Camp) was published 12 May 1967. This organization has been assigned the overall defense responsibility for 5.7km of the Chu Lai Base Camp Perimeter. Security forces are drawn from this battalion's resources in addition to those of the 94th Supply and Service Battalion, collocated with this organization. Defense commitments require 120 personnel for manning perimeter bunkers, 20 personnel for patrols, and 50 personnel for a rapid reaction force. Patrols are employed for investigation of suspicious activity within the area of responsibility; the reaction force reinforces/counterattacks the threatened portions of the perimeter.

b. Tactical Operations: Even though the mission of the Headquarters and Main Support Company is to provide direct support to Task Force Oregon base units only, it acted in direct support of tactical operations. The reason for this is the unusual organization of the Task Force maintenance elements. The three brigades of the Task Force are supported by assigned/attached maintenance units which are responsive to them alone. Tactical units separate from the brigades but attached to them for operational control are thus classified as base units and receive direct support from the Headquarters and Main Support Company; in this manner the below listed units received such support during the following tactical operations:

(1) 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment;

Oregon

OPORD 9-67 (no code name)

Cougar

Numerous search and destroy and road clearing operations

(2) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry:

Rhino

Bobcat

Numerous search and destroy operations

(3) 3rd Battalion, 16th Artillery and 3rd Battalion (-), 18th Artillery received direct support maintenance from this organization during all tactical operations they supported.

(4) A seven (7) man contact team consisting of four (4) artillery and three (3) engineer repairmen was attached to "D" Company,

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## Section I: Significant Organizational Activities (continued)

725th Maintenance Battalion for the duration of the reporting period. This team assisted "D" Company in the direct support of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry operating out of Duc Pho vic BS 8037.

### c. Maintenance Operations:

(1) In providing direct support to Task Force Oregon base units and backup support to the Brigades the following job orders, by type, were completed during the reporting period. (NOTE: Below statistics do not include job orders completed by contact team at Duc Pho).

#### (a) Headquarters and Main Support Company:

Artillery:	142
Automotive:	450
Engineer:	120
Small Arms	642
Instruments:	220
Electronics:	1,378
Other:	<u>258</u>
TOTAL:	3,210

#### (b) 335th Transportation Company (ADS):

Aircraft:	258
Components:	<u>299</u>
TOTAL:	557

(2) Job orders evacuated by 188th Maintenance Battalion to general support:

#### (a) Headquarters and Main Support Company:

Artillery:	0
Automotive	0
Engineer:	0
Small Arms:	12
Instruments:	26

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**Section I: Significant Organizational Activities (Continued)**

Electronics:	149
Other:	<u>14</u>
TOTAL:	201

**(b) 335th Transportation Company (4DS):**

Aircraft:	13
Components:	<u>162</u>
TOTAL:	175

(3) The Headquarters and Main Support Company, by TO&E, does not possess a small arms repair capability, however, it did complete 642 of such job orders. Upon being assigned the present mission it was realized that a small arms repair capability would be required. Through an intensive OJT program this requirement was met and thus necessary support in this area was provided.

(4) The large number of job orders evacuated by the 335th Transportation Company to backup support constituted primarily of 4th echelon repair jobs of components.

**6. LOGISTICS:**

a. Repair parts, other than aircraft, Red Ball and those obtained through this organization's MRE (Materiel Readiness Expediter) at Qui Nhon, came from the Depot at Cam Ranh Bay. The only means of transportation is by infrequent sealift. Time required for obtaining parts from the depot, irrespective of priority, averages 30 days or more. Lack of repair parts continues to present the biggest problem to the mission of the Headquarters and Main Support Company. The problem is twofold.

(1) The inability to procure repair parts rapidly contributes to excessive equipment down time.

(2) Non-secured roads between the widespread elements of the Task Force causes delay in distribution of repair parts and requires on-site maintenance which leads to inefficient use of available personnel.

b. 335th Transportation Company (4DS) requisitions repair parts from 58th Transportation Battalion Depot (ATMC), Saigon. Response from Depot averages 4.2 days, due primarily to use of South East Asia Airlift daily shipments.

c. The 188th Maintenance Battalion (DS) ASL (Authorized Stockage List) continues to expand as indicated by the number of line items listed below:

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## Section I: Significant Organizational Activities (Continued)

	<u>HMSC</u>	<u>335th Trans Co</u>
1 May 67:	7,213	7,214
31 Jul 67:	11,078	8,316

Due to the difficulties cited in paragraph 6a above, an average of 44% of the Headquarters and Main Support Company LSL was at zero balance during this reporting period.

d. Transportation support required for this organization on a continuous basis is indicated by the table below which summarizes the number of short tons processed during the reporting period:

	<u>HMSC</u>	<u>335th Trans Co</u>	<u>Total</u>
Repair Parts Received:	1,168 s/t	281 s/t	1,449 s/t
Repair Parts Shipped:	476 s/t	0	476 s/t
Unservicables Evacuated:	268 s/t	139 s/t	407 s/t

Parts were received from Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Saigon. Virtually all the repair parts shipped by Headquarters and Main Support Company went to Duc Pho while unservicable equipment was destined for Qui Nhon.

### 7. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Hostile Activity: During the reporting period this organization has not been subjected to any major incidents. However, harassing and probing actions by snipers have been numerous. Primarily these activities are restricted to night time. Three daytime incidents did occur; during one of which the 335th Transportation Company (ADS) suffered one KIA on 14 July 1967 within the confines of the Chu Lai base.

b. Casualties: 1 KIA, 14 July 1967.

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## SECTION II, PART I: OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION: None

B. INTELLIGENCE: None

C. PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

1. a. Item: Utilization of a COSTLR Maintenance Battalion as a Divisional Maintenance Battalion.

b. Discussion:

(1) The 186th Maintenance Battalion, as employed in Task Force Oregon, has the mission of a divisional maintenance battalion. However, only the Headquarters and Main Support Company and 335th Transportation Company are assigned or attached; the forward support elements with the three brigades are either assigned or attached to them. In such a situation the battalion has no effective operational control over these elements other than that which can be obtained through an amiable working relationship. In any case, they are subject to the interests of the brigades without regard to the overall required maintenance effort.

(2) Lack of operational control and, in some cases, geographical disposition of units precludes efficient management of the overall maintenance mission. The end result is that the workload is not channeled to the activity most able to receive it. Overburdened forward elements receive relief from the Headquarters and Main Support Company. Due to restricted road movement, evacuation is generally limited to only air transportable items; other equipment has to be repaired in place. The physical location of organizations together with the limited freedom to travel over the roads has at times forced forward elements to assume maintenance responsibility for other than brigade units. This is particularly true in the case of Task Force Artillery and Engineer Heavy Construction units. On such occasions the forward elements have been unable to fully assume the additional responsibility and have been augmented by the Headquarters and Main Support Company on either a job-to-job basis or by contact teams residing with the supported units.

(3) The Headquarters and Main Support Company, with a TO&E strength of 251 as opposed to 279 for a comparable divisional maintenance battalion, is required to support Task Force Oregon base which greatly exceeds a normal division base, particularly in artillery. Not only are TO&E resources fragmented as mentioned in paragraph 1b(2) but the maintenance requirements exceed the capabilities of the unit as measured in maintenance equivalents. There is a further lack in skills, by TO&E, such as small arms repair which the divisional maintenance battalion is authorized.

c. Observation: A COSTLR maintenance battalion is capable of providing support for a force of approximately a division. However, to be most effective, the forward support elements must be responsive to the direction of the battalion and thus must be, as a minimum, attached for operational control. Augmentation of personnel to provide for skills that are entirely lacking, where densities of equipment exceed capability, and

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## Section II, Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned) (Continued)

where split operation is required by the tactical situation is necessary.

### 2. a. Item: Additional equipment authorization.

b. Discussion: Since the substitution of MTO&E's as a basis of authorization of additional equipment in place of USARV Form 47 the time required for obtaining such equipment has become excessive. Sudden mission changes for a unit require equally rapid adjustment of unit equipment if it is to completely meet the new mission requirements. While USARV Form 47 was responsive to such requests, MTO&E's are cumbersome to complete and require long time delays for approval. The 335th Transportation Company (ADS) submitted a MTO&E during August 1966 and still, as of this date, has to receive final approval/disapproval for authorization of requisitions.

c. Observation: MTO&E's are not sufficiently responsive to additional equipment requests submitted by maintenance units. Some interim measure or theater TA is required to provide a rapid response to unit requirements in order that the unit may fully accomplish its mission.

### D. LOGISTICS:

1. Item: Transportation between repair parts depot and the organizational technical supply activity.

2. Discussion: The Headquarters and Main Support Company repair parts requisitions are processed through Qui Nhon to the depot at Cam Ranh Bay. The roads between Cam Ranh Bay and Chu Lai or even Qui Nhon are closed and air transportation for repair parts is not provided. The remaining mode of transportation, sealfit, is infrequent and has in the past taken up to four weeks to move the cargo. One problem is that there are no scheduled ships and thus repair parts marked for shipment are accumulated over a period of time to have a sufficient amount of cargo to justify requesting shipment. In essence then all requisitions, regardless of priority, are shipped by the same available means. The end result is that equipment continues to be deadlined for repair parts for excessive periods of time. Furthermore, a substantial portion (44%) of the LSL remains at zero balance. While this condition is primarily due to lack of the parts at depot, it is further aggravated by the slow shipping time.

3. Observations: Air transport for repair parts should be instituted where other modes of transport between depots and technical supply activities prove unreliable.

### E. TECHNICAL:

1. a. Item: Sheltered areas for balancing of helicopter rotor systems.

b. Discussion: Balancing of helicopter rotor systems is a sensitive operation requiring an environment free of disturbances such as wind. In areas where permanent structures are not available, the balancing has to be performed in maintenance tents as shown vans are too small to admit

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Section II, Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned) (Continued)

the assemblies. Maintenance tents were found not to be completely windproof thus making it extremely difficult to achieve truly balanced assemblies.

c. Observations: Transportable, windproof shelters are required in the field by helicopter maintenance units. One such structure would be an inflatable shelter of the types used by mobile hospital units.

2. a. Item: Ground handling device for UH-1 main rotor heads and blades.

b. Discussion: Ground handling of main rotor heads and blades is a difficult task especially if the working space is limited. This organization has constructed a portable, wheeled ground handling device by combining components available through supply channels. The device was built consisting of base, a preciler (FSN 4920-976-0975) and a head stand, built up bench assembly (FSN 4920-678-5431) in a minimum amount of time.

c. Observation: A maintenance operation can be made more efficient through an active self-help program in constructing devices in aid of repairs. Maximum utilization of available equipment in such devices will allow their construction with a minimum effort.

3. a. Item: Inspection of UH-1 helicopters employed in unusual conditions.

b. Discussion: The Task Force helicopters operate extensively along the sandy coastal region and at times over the South China Sea. This particular environment necessitates additional precautionary steps as spelled out below:

(1) Emergency exit releases have to be inspected for proper operation periodically. During a recent emergency ditching at sea the emergency jettison handles on both the pilot's and copilot's doors were inoperative causing an undue delay in the egress of both pilots.

(2) Blowing sand causes many problems some of which can be avoided by inspection and corrective action:

(a) Sand in the bleedband actuator will cause it to stick and in turn pop the bleedband.

(b) Sand collects in the engine intake area of parked helicopters. Upon starting, unless removed, this sand will be ingested into the engine and will shorten the engine life considerably.

c. Observation: Aircraft maintenance units should be aware of special precautions necessitated by a particular operational environment, take corrective steps, and advise supported units.

4. a. Item: Dirt accumulation hides flight safety conditions.

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## Section II, Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned) (Continued)

b. Discussion: Dirt accumulation will cover up cracks in load bearing members of an aircraft. In one case the transmission of a UH-1 helicopter was found to have an extensive crack at the point attaching it to the lifting link when the dirt was removed. It is estimated that the crack had been present for some time but went undetected because of the dirt.

c. Observations: In order to have a meaningful visual inspection all load bearing members of an aircraft must be clean.

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## SECTION II. PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

14


A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION: None

B. INTELLIGENCE: None

C. PLANS AND OPERATIONS: That a more rapid means be found for authorizing additional equipment requests than provided by submitting MTO&T's.

D. LOGISTICS: That air transport be provided for movement of repair parts when other modes of transportation have proven to be unreliable.

E. TECHNICAL: That windproof shelters be provided to aircraft maintenance units for the purpose of balancing helicopter rotor assemblies.

  
CECIL A. CHROME  
LTC, OrdC  
Commanding

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AVDF-SC-OP (9 August 1967)  
SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

1st Ind

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 15TH SUPPORT BRIGADE, APO San Francisco 96374 11 Aug 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

No comments or recommendations are made by this headquarters.

t/ROBERT B. PRIDGEN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

**Copies Furnished:**

CG, Task Force Oregon  
APO 96374

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AVHGC-DST (9 Aug 67) 2d Ind  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
 31 July 1967 (RGS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 NOV 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
 APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 188th Maintenance Battalion (DS) (CA9A) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning utilization of a COSTAR Maintenance Battalion, page 7, paragraph C1. MTOE's have been submitted to USARPAC which will formalize the Americal Division (formerly Task Force Oregon). The Headquarters and Main Support Company will be organized under TOE 29-16E at strength 302 as opposed to 279 in a normal Headquarters and Main Support Company and 251 in the 188th Maintenance Battalion. Upon approval of the MTOE by DA the 188th Maintenance Battalion will be inactivated, and the assets applied toward the new unit.

b. Reference item concerning additional equipment authorization, page 8, paragraph C2. This headquarters has no record of MTOE submitted by the 335th Transportation Company. It is not possible to return to the Form 47 for approval of excess items of equipment, since only DA has approval authority for controlled items. MTOE's provide a firm data base for DA to program current and future requirements for these controlled items. Although implementation of TAADS should greatly reduce the amount of time necessary for MTOE approval, current regulations provide for special processing of emergency requirements.

c. Reference item concerning sheltered areas for balancing of helicopter rotor systems, page 8, paragraph E1. Discussion and observation are valid. Delicate maintenance work such as balancing rotor systems requires near calm conditions for proper completion. These conditions can normally be effected in most areas in which helicopter maintenance is performed. The authorized maintenance tent will not always produce these results, but is sufficiently effective during most periods for proper rotor system balancing. Action to add inflatable buildings to the TOE is not recommended.

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AVHGC-DST (9 Aug 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning logistics, page 8, paragraph D. Concur. A letter is being sent to TMA requesting air shipment to bring the unit ASL to authorized level and air shipment of repair parts when requisition indicates equipment is deadlined for parts.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
no

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

cc: HQ, 188th Maint Bn (DS)  
HQ, 15th Spt Bde

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GPOP-DT(9 Aug 67)

3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967  
from HQ, 188th Maint Bn (DS) (UIC: WCA9AA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 20 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.
2. Reference paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement, GO 300 this headquarters, dated 2 December activated and organizes base units of the Americal Division. The order also inactivates the 188th Maintenance Battalion effective 15 January 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



1 Incl  
nc

K. F. OSBOURN  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG

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